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We explore the case of a casino that appeared to have adequate information systems and cash management controls in place, 
yet, nevertheless, became the victim of social engineering based overrides of software controls yielding a $420,000 potential 
loss. This case is illustrative of the need to recognize that effective IT auditing and control implementations in a complex 
setting, such as the multifaceted casino business environment, may be readily overridden by social engineering.  Here, we 
discuss the background to the case, casino operations in general, fraud at casinos, general as well as IT-specific controls for 
casinos, and cover how a slot machine works.  Finally, we present the Birdland Casino1 slot machine scam based on data 
collected from a site visit and examination of legal documents, and examine the implications of this fraud in terms of an 
analysis of the collapse of general IT controls resulting from social engineering in complex environments.   
Keywords   
Fraud, IT controls, general controls, IT auditing, social engineering 
INTRODUCTION 
Casinos are an alluring industry for technology-based fraudulent activity. Because the systems are heavily cash based, 
innovative fraudsters may attempt to circumvent controls to commit scams, cons, fraud and outright theft.  The IT literature 
emphasizes the importance of controls for information systems security, yet we seem to minimize or overlook evidence about 
the ease with which social engineering can derail adequately built control mechanisms (Luo, Brody, Seazzu, and Burd, 2010).  
Some research theorizes that individual levels of “mindfulness” can add to information systems reliability, emphasizing the 
need for individual-level cognition about systems in complex organizational environments (Butler and Gray, 2006), not 
unlike that found in a casino.  Successfully implementing best practice fraud controls may not inoculate information systems 
from a social engineering hack of the individual working within complex environments.  It may be that the successful fraud 
IT auditor requires an increased awareness that employees present important vulnerabilities in complex systems. 
The gaming industry is a large and growing sector of the US economy.  In 2007, revenues from the gaming industry were 
conservatively reported to be at least $92 billion (Kizirian, Heinze, and Lees, 2011), with growth rates estimated to be as high 
as 22 percent per year (Longmore-Etheridge, 2005).  Estimates of the size of the market vary wildly, but revenues worldwide 
may top $100 billion per year (Webb, 2007).  One out of four US adults typically visit a casino at least once each year 
(Albanese, 2008).   
                                                          
1
 Note:  Name of casino, some identifying details and the names of the alleged fraudsters have been changed for the purposes 
of this paper because the case has not cleared its way through the legal system.  The legal, newspaper and news sources that 
were used to research and support the case are not reported in the references section of this paper because the alleged 
fraudsters have not been tried in a court of law.  Further, the researchers conducted an ex post site visit to compare a list of 
well-known casino controls to observed controls.   
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In the 1960s, gaming in the form of casinos, betting and off track wagering in the US was typically illegal except for Nevada 
(Eadington, 1999).  With the advent of state authorized gambling in South Dakota, Connecticut, Indian reservations, 
riverboats, Atlantic City and the traditional mecca of Nevada, gaming has exploded in growth. Technology has enabled a lot 
of this growth, with casino entertainment based on many new technologies (Eadington, 1999).  Alongside of this explosion of 
casinos and the gaming industry has been a concurrent explosion of fraud in casinos.  Albanese studied linkages between 
employee casino gambling problems and rates of workplace forgery, embezzlement and fraud, finding that the underlying 
rationalizations for events differ broadly, but that some percentage of fraudsters do cite gambling for illicit actions (Albanese, 
2008).  The introduction of casinos to a region may tip the balance of larcenies and fraud from drug related to gambling 
related in some cases (Kelly, et al., 2010).   
The real boom in gambling is yet to come.  Not to be overlooked, online gaming is also blossoming into a major industry 
quite apart from the rest of the casino gaming industry, with worldwide online gaming revenues at $9.2 billion in 2004, and 
climbing (Longmore-Etheridge, 2005).  Online gambling is more complicated to audit, and much of it is located offshore, 
making it unregulated and less easily prosecuted.  Some have major concerns about online gambling becoming a problem in 
the workplace using organizational computers, and that the easy access to online gambling may lead to employee gambling 
problems and fraud in the workplace (Kelly, and Hartley, 2010).   
BREADTH OF CASINO OPERATIONS 
Casino play consists of table games such as poker, roulette, blackjack, baccarat, dice and Keno, among others, slot machine 
play and sports and race betting (Kilby, Fox and Lucas, 2005).  In Las Vegas, about half of casino wins come from slot 
machines, and about 67 percent of total casino wins come from slots in the rest of Nevada (Kilby, et al., 2005).  The larger 
commercial operations such as the MGM Mirage and Harrah’s contribute about one third of total US revenue from gambling, 
with the Indian casinos at about a quarter, and state lotteries at about a quarter (Kizirian, et al., 2011).  The largest 20 
companies hold about 20 percent of the market (Kizirian, et al., 2011).  
It is clear from the breadth of the industry that it is important for the IT auditor to have a thorough understanding of the 
gaming and non-gaming internal controls (Rudloff, 1999).  Beyond gambling, casinos have business operations including 
childcare monitoring, hospitality, retail, entertainment and more (Kizirian, et al., 2011), and IT controls are as necessary in 
these areas of the business as much as in the gambling side of the house.  Fraud prevention in the casino industry is about 
controlling the fraud associated with gambling as well as controlling the fraud associated with the hospitality and retail 
industry.   
FRAUD IN CASINOS 
Casinos by their very nature are more susceptible to fraud because they are cash based businesses with high transactions 
levels, and no product or physical good is exchanged for the fees paid.  Not all transactions can be recorded, cash is used in 
many aspects of the business, and thus many of the activities are not easily measurable.  Indeed, the casino industry has a 
higher than average risk of fraud due to this cash based feature of the business (Mills, 1996, Mills and Yamamura, 1996, 
Salierno, 2005).  Reports indicate that about one third of casino fraud comes from its own employees (Boss and Florence, 
2001).   
It is also interesting to note that the casino industry has some of the most sophisticated fraud detection and control 
mechanisms in business, which is a source of opportunity for auditors (Salierno, 2005).  Because of this susceptibility, the 
industry has several auditing teams at play.  Often a casino will have its own internal audit team who conduct random, 
surprise audits on a 24/7 basis.  Casinos also employ external professional audit firms, and some have teams that are state 
based employees who perform audits.  Each state is a little bit different.  For example, Nevada requires that casinos follow 
“minimum internal control standards,” while New Jersey has the requirement that external teams are used for monitoring, and 
the New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement will make random checks on casinos in that state (Mills, 1991).   
CONTROLS FOR CASINOS 
Casino fraud control consists of a multilayered approach, using simple controls all the way up to sophisticated Non-Obvious 
Relationship Awareness (NORA) database analytics.   
The MGM Mirage is an example of a casino with a multilayered approach to fraud control.  The Las Vegas MGM builds 
surveillance as its centerpiece defense, using camera systems to observe all cash handling 24 hours per day (Salierno, 2005).  
MGM also reviews all employees with background checks as well as reviews any possible vendor or supplier for security 
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reasons (Salierno, 2005).   Lastly, MGM Mirage uses a detailed internal auditing team that conducts fraud risk assessments at 
all levels of the organization (Salierno, 2005).   
Surveillance as a control is very effective in a cash based industry like gambling.  Video audits are used to monitor games, 
and also to monitor employees.  Surveillance can be used to find fraud where employees comp guests for higher amounts 
than they are due based on their level of play, and then they receive tips from the customer that are in excess of what might 
normally be paid to them.  Employees have also been found to be skimming money from coffee kiosks via video (Boss, et al., 
2001), or stealing chips from a blackjack game without clapping their hands at the end of the play (Boss, et al., 2001).   
Business analytics, perpetual analytics (Boss, et al., 2003) or NORA, is another control commonly used in the casino 
industry.  Monthly sales, computerized slot machine data, any data that can be monitored and compared to a normal range are 
all useful inputs to good control.  For example, the odds of winning at each game are well known in the business, called the 
“theoretical win.”  A theoretical win is what the casino should be winning from the client, all else equal, and it is calculated 
based on the advantage to the casino for the game, the average size of the client’s bet, the amount of time the person plays the 
game, and then some rating which refers to the quality or skill of that particular customer (Rudloff, 1999).  Some fraud is 
based on “comping,” or giving that player more free items (free hotel stays, better restaurant upgrades, free drinks) than that 
player might deserve, while the employee doing the comping takes a cut of that higher comp amount via a kickback of some 
kind (Marden and Edwards, 2005, Rudloff, 1999).  Computerized databases of expectations can be kept on players, and 
deviations from normal can be used as jumping off places for potential auditing trails for comping abuse by employees.  
NORA software found that 24 of a major casino’s VIPs were known in the industry as “cheaters,” for example (Boss, et al., 
2003).   
Product certification is another control used in the casino industry.  To protect against hacking, machines must be accepted 
by the casinos only after they have passed a rigorous acceptance protocol, or product certification.  This control is to prohibit 
the alteration of slot machines, or other electronic devices, so that a gambler is not able to open, alter or change that machine 
and make it pay out more than it was designed to do (Webb, 2007).   
Chip fraud is another area for abuse.  All chips have a monetary value, and can be counterfeited or stolen.  RFID chips can be 
used to prevent this type of fraud by keeping track of the physical location of chips, along with the outcomes of games where 
these chips are used, preventing unwarranted payouts or other types of fraud (Webb, 2007).  Frequent player cards are a good 
work around for chip and money usage, and these add an additional layer of security because players’ spending and wins can 
be monitored and tracked (Rudloff, 1999).   
Cash monitoring of large amounts and its associated documentation is at the heart of casino control.  Cash movements should 
all be documented with a paper trail, from the cashier’s cage drop to the counting room, from the slot machine to the slot 
machine fill, from the checks taken to the bank and to the payout documentation for sports betting (Mills, 1996, Mills, et al., 
1996).  The Money Laundering Act of 1986 requires that all cash transactions over $10,000 be accounted for with a Currency 
Transaction Report (Marden, et al., 2005, Mills, et al, 1996).   
Physical controls are also useful in casino fraud management.  Simple “drop boxes” are often used to move money around a 
casino- these are boxes that can accept cash, but cannot be opened by the person who puts the cash into the box.  Only a 
different person in different room can open the box and count it, and both actions are typically watched by overhead camera.  
It is critical to have physical and paper controls in the areas of the casino where money is exchanged for chips and a lot of 
cash is moving around in a hurry, often in a late night party, drinking fueled scenario (Mills, 1996).  Rotating people for 
shifts and using different teams is also important (Mills, 1996).   
HOW DOES A SLOT MACHINE WORK? 
Historically, slot machines were electromechanical devices, but have evolved into remarkably sophisticated computerized 
gaming machines (Webb, 2007).  Bally dominates production, and has a sophisticated “game within game” feature that is 
popular with players (Kilby, et al., 2005).  Some machines are themed, some have a double bonus feature that is interacted 
with via a touch screen display (Kelly, et al., 2005).  Bally’s themed machines include Popeye, Dagwood and Blondie and the 
Lone Ranger, among others (Kilby, et al., 2005).  Machines can have a playable top glass, and some have a coin tray at the 
bottom.   
Slots dominate in the industry, and are a core device for gambling play.  For instance, in 1998, Atlantic City had 35,057 slot 
machines and only 1,516 table games (Albanese, 2008).  Slot machine revenue was 65 percent of the total revenue in 1998, 
70 percent for Atlantic City, and 95 percent for Colorado at that same time, indicating the importance of slot machines to 
total revenues (Eadington, 1999).  Some estimate that as much as 90 percent of total US casino revenue comes from slots, 
although this number might be inflated (Albanese, 2008).   
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In parallel to their heavy usage, slots have long been a source of fraud to casinos. In the mid ‘70s, about $7 million was 
“improperly taken” from four casinos in Las Vegas (Mills, 1991).  A key holder can take the money out of the slot machine, 
especially if several people crowd around the machine and block the view of the machine by the overhead surveillance 
cameras (Luizzo, et al., 1998).  Good slot machine controls include having three people act as counters for slot revenues, 
separate the counters from the slot machine supervisors, and use record keeping of amounts counted, along with wrapping of 
coins, and signatures by the employees who count the coins (Mills, 1991).  These steps allow not only documentation of 
received cash, but also give a separation of duties aspect to slot machine revenue record keeping.   
Slot machines have a design feature called the “coin in feature” that keeps track of how much the machine is winning, and 
this can be compared to how much the machine is programmed to be winning (Kilby, et al., 2005).  In coin based machines, 
there is a hopper to collect coins, and an overflow bucket for this hopper which functions like an internal bank, according to 
Kilby, et al., 2005.  The casino advantage is how much the machine is supposed to make for the casino, and usually a “hold” 
is made to calculate the amount that is won by the slot (Kilby, et al., p. 115).  The “progressive” is the deferred payout 
amount that must be escrowed, and it can be linked to many machines (called a “linked progressive,”), with a “progressive 
accrual” made across several machines (Kilby, et al., 2005, pp. 115-116).  The “handpay” is a controlled payout where the 
winner must go to a cashier to cash out on winnings (Kilby, et al., 2005, p. 116).   Some linked progressives can run over 
1500 machines, and the linked progressive accrual might be kept on a centralized server with data accumulated about a 
network of slot machines.   
THE BIRDLAND CASINO SLOT MACHINE FRAUD 
In June 2009 through August 2009, in a small, regional casino located in a downscale strip mall neighborhood just outside of 
a Midwestern city, located just off an exit ramp for a major highway, an alleged fraudster manipulated 61 payouts totaling 
about $420,000 on 14 to 16 dates from a single machine using the “double up feature” which he was able to get activated by 
social engineering of a slots technician.   
In a visit to the Birdland Casino, the researchers were able to find evidence of many of the standard casino controls discussed 
above, such as plexiglass boxes for chip collections at table games, wire mesh around the technology servers, bars on the 
cashiers’ cages, name tags with photos for personnel, security guards, and a match between the readout on the slot machine 
and the ticket yielding the payout of the machine.  When signing up for a “Player’s Card,” one of the two researchers was not 
given the advertised free lottery card, which might have been an oversight, or might have been a purposeful pocketing of the 
card.  Additionally, there were triple rows of video “eyes” in the ceiling above high dollar environments, such as the cashier 
cages and higher end table games.  There were two guards per entrance at a minimum, signage about age restriction 
requirements, and a receipt given for food transactions without a request made for it.  Some slot machines were visibly 
marked as “progressive machines.”  The Birdland Casino did not seem to use any coin based machines, and an auditory noise 
like coins in a jackpot would play if one won at the slot.  There was a row of approximately eight slot machines with a sign 
taped on each saying, “Out of order,” or “Service.”  Some slot machines had a non-functioning “arm” to look like the old 
fashioned mechanical slot machine, but all machines appeared to be chip based computer gaming devices (Kleist and Morris, 
2012).   
The alleged perpetrator has a well cut, pompadour-like hair cut, and is frequently seen in online news videos about the fraud 
wearing a sportcoat and necktie, looking young, prosperous, and appearing to be somewhat glamorous.  In the videos of his 
public arrest and handcuffing by the FBI, he stridently and confidently insists of his innocence to the cameras, and states that 
he is not guilty of anything, and that he merely won at slots by taking advantage of an embedded and legally available 
software feature of the slot machine.  The alleged fraudster has an air of the “high roller” about him, and seems like someone 
who must be right.  Indeed, he is very convincing as to his innocence.   
To commit the fraud, the alleged perpetrator was able to convince a slot technician to alter a feature in a slot machine to 
allow “a software glitch” to be triggered that allowed the “double up feature” to be engaged when it was not the policy of the 
casino to use that feature.  The alleged perpetrator might have made the technician feel a bit like he was a second class 
worker in a backwater casino, as he reportedly told the slots technician that he “often had the technicians activate this in Las 
Vegas.”  The alleged perpetrator probably made the technician feel less knowledgeable than a slots technician in the fancier 
Las Vegas casinos by social engineering.  When the researchers visited the Birdland Casino, we were able to have 
conversations with two slots technicians, and both employees were friendly and forthcoming. The table games personnel did 
not appear to be as friendly, and they kept their hands in full view while running the craps table, for example (Kleist et al., 
2012).   
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The double up feature was able to be enabled on the machine simply by the technician’s on-screen manipulation of the touch 
screen.  When the researchers visited Birdland, we were able to find several slot machines which had a label on the screen 
titled, “Double Up”  (Kleist, et al., 2012).  The slots technician was not a suspect in the case, and he had gone to his 
supervisor to find out if the double up feature was allowed to be used or not.  The supervisor said no, and the slots technician 
subsequently thought that he had turned the feature off according to his employer’s policy.  Unfortunately, the technician did 
not also realize that the machine needed to be restarted to remove the already enabled feature from engaging, and thus the 
hack was deployed unbeknownst to the casino employees and management.  According to the court docket report, the hack of 
the slot machine was done by enabling the double up feature and then not turning it off once it was enabled.   
The alleged perpetrator used two other accomplices to further bypass casino controls by having them collect the cash for the 
handpay control, thus reducing suspicions about one person winning such large payouts on slots in a short timeframe from a 
single machine.  One of the alleged accomplices was a small town policeman who was older, and did not have the appearance 
of the high roller.  He seemed to be in his late ‘forties or early ‘fifties.  The second alleged accomplice was also not a high 
roller type of individual, and, although also older, he was not sufficiently successful to be able to afford his own apartment 
and had a roommate.  Some fraudster action was blocked from the cameras, but surveillance cameras were able to show that 
the alleged perpetrator had the two accomplices pick up the winnings from the cages to allay suspicions.   In our visit, it was 
difficult to see how any person could block the cameras from the slot player action, as ceiling mounted cameras were heavily 
distributed across the casino, but these could have been added since the alleged fraud occurred (Kleist, et al., 2012).   
The small town DA on the case was hard driving, and he has subsequently moved on to private practice.   The FBI became 
involved because it was felt that this same software hack was perpetrated by the alleged fraudster in Las Vegas, making it a 
Federal crime. It is possible that this “double up feature” software glitch was similarly enabled by unsuspecting slots 
technicians all across the US at smaller casinos as well.  The software hack was easily scalable, and could be potentially yield 
large profits without raising suspicion if done in small enough bets.  The alleged perpetrator might have been able to keep the 
fraud under the radar of the internal auditors and management by taking a smaller amount of winnings, being less greedy, but 
the $420,000 was too tempting and he got caught.  The Birdland Casino incident was a low level hack that was able to yield 
some pretty spectacular payouts before he was caught by the local law enforcement and later the FBI.  There is some question 
as to if the FBI will be able to prove that the alleged perpetrator was committing the same crime in other venues.   
Interestingly enough, the casino was fined for its role in not stopping the alleged fraud.  The fine was $48,900, assessed by 
the Pennsylvania Gaming Authority for the casino’s failure to disable the double up software feature, as well as other fines 
related to the software IT hack of the slot machine.  According to the DA on the case, “’The actors were able to cause casino 
personnel to change a software feature, an option on the screen of the casino’s machine.  Throughout the process, they had 
knowledge of a particular software glitch that they exploited.  Once the machine was compromised, they were able to 
basically make it pay out at their will.’”  According to news reports at the time (again, not cited due to the alleged 
perpetrator’s not having been to trial):  “Authorities discovered the ruse when they noticed the men cashing jackpots for each 
other so it wouldn’t look as though the same person was winning all of the time.”   
LESSONS LEARNED 
In the Birdland Casino case, it seems that many recommended controls were in position for what should have yielded 
effective control of the slot machine unit.  For instance, the casino had video surveillance and these videos were used to 
determine that the person winning at the “rigged” slot machine was not the same person as the collector of the winnings.  
Further, the casino had implemented the handpay control approach where winnings had to be picked up and documented at 
by employees at the cage window.  The casino may have used perpetual analytics software in that the scam was eventually 
caught because of flagged anomalies in payouts on one machine.  The slots technician was paid a reasonable salary, 
documented in the legal case, reducing the employee’s temptation to become involved in a fraud.  The FBI and DA stated 
that the technician was not engaged in the fraudulent behavior.  Indeed, the slots technician turned the event over to his 
supervisor as an anomaly event.   
Yet, despite well-functioning controls, $420,000 in unauthorized winnings was extracted from the Birdland Casino over an 
extended period by three actors.  If in use, perpetual analytics software did not seem to trigger a timely alert on the unusually 
high pattern of winnings from a single machine for 61 occasions on about 15 different dates.  This delay in triggering an 
anomaly alert might be attributed to three different actors picking up winnings on a single machine rather than a single actor, 
although that is supposition.  We do know that Birdland’s “product certification” control practices allowed a machine that 
had a non-authorized “double up” feature to be out on the casino floor without this function fully disabled prior to being put 
into service.  In a conversation with a different slots technician from that same casino, the researchers found that Birdland’s 
slot machines are often leased, and they change inventory frequently, likely making the certification control procedure 
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difficult to implement (Kleist, et al., 2012).  This lack of an effective product certification control was partially what allowed 
the socially engineered manipulation to take place.  It was unclear if casino personnel knew much about the slots machine 
software, and about the double up feature. Additionally, camera surveillance control was circumvented by the placement of 
the actors, blocking the view, according to legal documents.  Lastly, and most importantly, low tech social engineering was 
used by the alleged fraudster to convince a possibly less confident slots technician to alter a machine on the floor.  Neither 
the supervisor nor the technician knew that the software alteration was still in place when the slots technician thought that he 
had disabled the feature.  The lesson learned from our Birdland Casino case is that no matter how broad and carefully 
deployed are casino controls, controls can be circumvented by fraudsters with effective social engineering skills.  As Kevin 
Mitnick warns in his book The Art of Intrusion, effective social engineering continues to be a root enabler to many effective 
hacking frauds (Mitnick, 2006).   
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we covered the details of an interesting hack of a slot machine’s software.  Despite the oversight of state 
gaming boards, internal auditors and external auditors, this case demonstrates that fraudsters are very cunning individuals that 
can identify, target, manipulate, exploit and then succeed against even the most control-aware casinos.  Our example shows 
how a slick, smooth operator can still use social engineering on one individual to repeatedly exploit a simple slot machine to 
allegedly steal $420,000.  As the industry increasingly shifts to the online and software based gaming environment, 
awareness of good IT control approaches will be even more important for the casino IT auditing practitioner.  Just as Luo, et 
al. argue, a focus on the potential damage from social engineering is equally as important as implementing IT controls for 
fraud prevention, and yet this is an often overlooked area for security management (Luo, et al., 2010).  An organization can 
have best-of-breed controls, but instilling what Butler and Gray call “collective mindfulness” in employees may be the more 
difficult objective to achieve in a complex environment (Buter, et al., 2006).  This case serves to indicate that a focus on good 
IT and other controls was not enough to prevent a software based fraud via social engineering.   
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